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The	Burden	of	Inheritance	Tax		Joyce	and	Sybil	Burden	are	unmarried	sisters.	They	are	aged	88	and	81	respectively,	and	for	the	past	thirty	years	have	lived	in	a	house	built	on	land	inherited	from	their	parents.	If	each	leaves	their	share	of	the	house	and	other	property	to	the	other	by	will,	the	house	might	have	to	be	sold	in	order	to	pay	the	inheritance	tax.	This	is	charged	at	a	rate	of	40%	under	the	Inheritance	Tax	Act	1984	(Inheritance	Act	1984,	ss.	3,	3A	and	4),	although	it	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	the	actual	likelihood	of	the	house	having	to	be	sold	has	been	doubted	(See	"Editor's	Note"	in	[2006]	9	I.T.L.R	535,	537-538).	The	same	level	of	tax	would	be	payable	if	one	sister	transferred	the	house	to	the	other	inter	vivos,	and	then	died	within	seven	years	of	doing	so.	However,	no	inheritance	tax	would	be	payable	if	the	sisters	had	been	a	married	couple	(Inheritance	Act	1984,	s.	18(1)),	and	perhaps	even	more	significantly,	this	"marriage	exception"	was	extended	to	same-sex	couples	entering	a	civil	partnership	when	the	latter	became	available	in	December	2005.	Parties	in	other	familial	or	interdependent	relationships	are	not	given	any	form	of	relief.	In	Burden	and	Burden	v.	United	Kingdom	(App.	No.	13378/05,	[2007]	1	F.C.R.	69)	(hereafter	"Burden"),	the	sisters	sought	to	challenge	the	relevant	provisions	before	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(hereafter	"the	Court").	By	a	bare	majority,	the	Court	held	that	there	had	been	no	discrimination	under	Article	14	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(hereafter	"the	Convention"),	in	respect	of	the	right	to	peaceful	enjoyment	of	property	(Article	1	of	the	First	Protocol	to	the	Convention).	This	decision	is	as	deferential	as	its	result	is	tragic,	a	fact	recognised	by	the	dissenting	judges.	This	note	will	argue	that	reform	of	the	inheritance	tax	system	should	be	undertaken	to	accommodate	situations	such	as	that	faced	by	the	Burdens.	However,	a	significant	redeeming	feature	of	the	case,	namely	its	lack	of	effect	on	the	concept	of	civil	partnership,	will	become	apparent	in	due	course.	Although	I	intend	to	deal	primarily	with	the	family	and	property	law	aspects	of	this	decision,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	two	of	the	UK's	submissions	led	to	pronouncements	of	more	general	importance	for	cases	brought	under	the	Convention.	Firstly,	the	Government	sought	to	argue	that	since	no	inheritance	tax	had	yet	accrued,	the	Burdens	were	only	hypothetical	victims.	However,	the	Court	held	that	it	was	"virtually	certain"	that	one	of	them	would	be	affected	by	inheritance	tax	in	the	near	future,	and	that	this	was	sufficient	to	render	them	"directly	affected"	by	a	violation,	(paras.	[27]-[29])	as	required	in	cases	such	as	Cornwell	v.	United	Kingdom	(App.	No.	36578/97,	ECHR	11	May	1999).	Secondly,	the	Court	dismissed	the	UK's	claim	that	the	applicants	should	have	sought	a	declaration	of	incompatibility	under	section	4	of	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	before	bringing	the	case	to	Strasbourg.	It	was	emphasised	that	such	a	declaration	is	not	binding	on	the	parties	to	the	case	in	which	it	is	made	and	only	confers	on	the	minister	concerned	a	power	rather	than	a	duty	to	amend	the	offending	legislation.	Therefore,	section	4	does	not	necessarily	provide	an	effective	remedy	(para.	[39]).	It	is	now	clear	that	this	element	of	the	decision	in	Hobbs	v.	United	Kingdom	(App.	No.	63684/00,	ECHR	18	June	2002)	is	of	general	application.	
Having	unanimously	declared	the	Burdens'	application	admissible,	the	Court	went	on	to	consider	its	substantive	merits.	The	Court	had	no	difficulty	in	deciding	that	Article	1	of	Protocol	1	was	engaged,	since	the	case	involved	taxation	on	existing	property	(para.	[53]).	The	applicability	of	Article	14,	on	the	other	hand,	was	much	more	problematic.	The	Government	argued	that	the	sisters	had	not	entered	a	formal	commitment,	financial	or	otherwise,	to	each	other.	They	described	their	relationship	as	an	"accident	of	birth"	and	contrasted	the	situation	with	that	of	married	couples	and	civil	partners	(para.	[47]).	The	applicants	countered	this,	somewhat	convincingly	in	my	view,	by	arguing	that	they	had	in	fact	taken	on	obligations	towards	each	other,	and	that	they	were	legally	prevented	from	doing	so	formally.	They	argued	that	their	decision	to	share	their	lives	in	this	way	was	"just	as	much	an	expression	of	their	respective	self-determination	and	personal	development"	as	a	decision	to	become	a	spouse	or	a	civil	partner	(para.	[50]).	The	only	difference,	they	claimed,	was	that	they	were	not	permitted	to	have	a	sexual	relationship.	As	this	is	not	a	requirement	in	a	civil	partnership,	it	was	argued	this	was	irrelevant	(ibid.).	Although	these	submissions	of	the	parties	were	discussed,	the	majority	neatly	side-stepped	this	fundamental	issue.	They	did	not	feel	the	need	to	decide	whether	the	Burdens	were	in	a	situation	factually	analogous	to	a	married	couple	or	a	civil	partnership,	since	even	if	they	were,	the	relevant	inheritance	tax	provisions	pursued	a	legitimate	aim	in	a	proportionate	manner	within	the	margin	of	appreciation,	such	that	Article	14	was	not	contravened	(para.	[58]).	The	legitimate	aim	being	pursued,	as	articulated	by	the	Government	and	accepted	by	the	Court,	is	the	encouragement	of	stable	homosexual	and	heterosexual	relationships.	Few	would	doubt	that	this	aim	is	legitimate,	and	perhaps	it	is	justifiable	to	grant	tax	advantages	to	the	particular	categories	of	stable	family	relationships	where	economic	interdependence	is	likely.	In	contrast,	the	Burdens'	relationship	as	sisters,	while	both	stable	and	familial,	could	legitimately	be	given	less	favourable	treatment	due	to	their	being	in	a	category	where	the	parties	are	more	likely	to	be	independent.	As	the	Court	was	at	pains	to	point	out,	tax	systems	inevitably	depend	on	relatively	broad	categorisations	that	inevitably	exclude	some	hard	cases	for	reasons	of	administrative	efficiency	(para.	[60]).	The	Court	also	began	with	the	premise	that	it	is	for	the	state	to	determine	the	categorisations	to	be	used	in	the	taxation	system	unless	it	is	both	"manifestly	without	reasonable	foundation"	and	contrary	to	Article	14	(para.	[54]).	This	test	is	also	relatively	sound,	and	understandable	given	the	range	of	taxation	systems	to	which	the	Convention	will	be	applied.	What	is	far	from	clear,	however,	is	why	the	extent	of	the	differential	treatment	present	in	the	Inheritance	Act	was	considered	by	the	majority	to	have	such	a	reasonable	foundation.	This	is	especially	true	where	the	discrimination	is	based	on	a	factor	that	the	Burdens	could	never	change,	namely	that	they	are	within	the	prohibited	degrees	of	relationship	and	thus	could	not	enter	a	civil	partnership	(Civil	Partnership	Act	2004,	Schedule	1).	The	latter	point	means	that,	as	the	majority	accepted	(para.	[58]),	the	case	can	be	distinguished	from	that	of	Shackell	v.	United	Kingdom	(Application.	No.	45851/99,	ECHR	27	April	2000),	in	which	the	Court	reached	a	similar	decision	in	relation	to	unmarried	cohabitants	outside	the	prohibited	degrees.	Unfortunately,	the	Court	did	not	apply	this	distinction	when	it	rendered	its	conclusion	in	Burden.	
The	1984	Act	adopts	an	all-or-nothing	approach:	those	in	a	marriage	or	civil	partnership	are	given	an	absolute	exemption	from	inheritance	tax,	while	everyone	else	is	faced	with	a	bill	amounting	to	40%	of	the	inherited	assets	beyond	a	certain	threshold,	plus	interest	that	starts	accruing	at	the	time	of	death.	Significantly,	this	threshold	has	failed	to	keep	pace	with	rising	house	prices	(see	section	98	of	the	Finance	Act	2005	for	the	figures),	and	the	tax	operates	regardless	of	the	level	of	economic	interdependence	or	familial	relationship	between	the	parties.	It	is	therefore	the	application	of	the	proportionality	test	and	the	margin	of	appreciation	by	the	majority	that	is	truly	open	to	question.	The	Court	appeared	to	almost	automatically	find	that	the	UK	had	acted	proportionately	and	within	their	(admittedly	wide)	margin	of	appreciation	once	a	legitimate	aim	had	been	ascertained	(paras.	[60]-[61]);	Judges	Bonello	and	Garlicki	jointly	dissented	on	this	basis.	The	joint	dissenters	accepted	a	presumption	in	favour	of	the	Government,	i.e.	that	a	particular	taxation	measure	is	justified	and	within	the	margin	of	appreciation.	However,	they	were	of	the	view	that	once	the	applicants	had	demonstrated	a	situation	of	"apparent	hardship	or	injustice",	as	the	majority	accepted	they	had	in	this	case,	the	onus	shifted	to	the	Government	to	justify	the	measure	and	the	Court	must	provide	a	full	explanation	if	it	is	successfully	to	invoke	the	margin	of	appreciation.	Both	the	Government	and	the	majority	had	failed	to	meet	this	requirement,	according	to	Judges	Bonello	and	Garlickli.	Judge	Pavlovschi,	meanwhile,	gave	a	more	emotive	dissent,	branding	the	decision	of	the	majority	"legal,	but	unfair".	He	echoed	the	view	of	the	other	dissenters	that	the	majority	had	produced	insufficient	evidence	that	the	UK's	approach	was	within	the	margin	of	appreciation.	He	saw	the	case	as	involving	not	simply	a	piece	of	property,	but	the	family	home	itself,	thus	giving	rise	to	issues	under	Article	8	of	the	Convention.	The	learned	judge	refused	to	accept	that	there	was	a	pressing	social	need	to	cause	suffering	in	addition	to	that	inherent	in	losing	one's	sister.	While	many	may	bemoan	the	sparseness	of	Judge	Pavlovschi's	legal	reasoning	on	this	point,	few	would	question	his	intuition.	However,	it	is	submitted	that	there	are	definite	legal	reasons	why	the	result	in	this	case	is	unjust,	and	that	more	discussion	and	analysis	should	have	been	undertaken	before	the	margin	of	appreciation	was	invoked.	With	respect,	the	Court	should	have	decided	whether	the	Burdens	were	in	a	relationship	functionally	similar	to	marriage,	discussed	the	margin	of	appreciation	at	greater	length	and	taken	account	of	the	Government's	failure	to	produce	evidence	of	the	costs	of	providing	an	exemption	for	people	in	their	situation	(para.	[52]).	Overall,	the	decision	of	the	majority	betrays	an	irony	in	the	jurisprudence	of	the	Court.	On	the	one	hand,	it	has	shown	a	reasonable	level	of	willingness	to	recognise	the	diversity	of	modern	family	relationships,	as	illustrated	by	cases	such	as	Goodwin	v.	United	Kingdom	(App.	No.	28957/95,	(2002)	35	E.H.R.R.	18).	On	the	other,	in	Burden	it	largely	refused	to	sympathise	with	the	consequences	of	the	relationship	between	two	people	in	a	more	"traditional"	and	long-recognised	category.	It	is	likely	that	much	turns	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	consensus	between	the	Contracting	Parties	on	the	particular	issue	in	question.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	note	to	suggest	a	comprehensive	overhaul	of	the	inheritance	tax	system,	or	to	question	the	tax	itself	as	a	political	principle.	It	does	seem	reasonable	to	suggest	that	some	relief	provision	should	be	made	where	two	people	within	the	prohibited	degrees	of	relationship	share	a	house.	A	
scheme	addressed	specifically	to	all	cases	of	actual	economic	interdependence	(i.e.	prioritising	function	over	form)	may	well	produce	fairer	results.	However,	this	is	likely	to	be	considered	unworkable	in	a	system	so	dependent	on	categorisation,	and	the	extent	of	the	problem	may	be	limited	given	that	couples	outside	the	prohibited	degrees	at	least	have	the	option	to	register	a	marriage	or	a	civil	partnership,	however	counterintuitive	it	may	seem	in	a	platonic	relationship.	That	said,	it	does	not	necessarily	follow	that	civil	partnerships	should	be	extended	to	those	within	the	prohibited	degrees.	In	fact,	the	Court's	resistance	of	the	temptation	to	declare	that	the	Civil	Partnership	Act	itself	breached	Article	14	by	discriminating	against	those	within	the	prohibited	degrees	is	the	silver	lining	of	the	decision	in	Burden.	Any	other	conclusion	reached	by	the	Court	may	have	fatally	undermined	the	concept	of	a	civil	partnership	in	its	infancy.	The	introduction	of	a	status	legally	(even	if	not	nominally,	socially	or	culturally)	equivalent	to	marriage	for	same-sex	couples	is	an	aim	as	legitimate	as	that	of	promoting	stable	familial	relationships	more	generally.	The	2004	Act	admirably	avoids	most	suggestions	of	discrimination	on	the	grounds	of	sexual	orientation	under	Article	14.	Unlike	the	effect	of	the	inheritance	tax	provisions,	it	was	a	prime	candidate	for	deference,	and	thankfully	the	Court	did	not	interfere.	To	their	credit,	the	applicants	conceded	that	the	Court	could	not	dictate	to	the	Government	how	best	to	remedy	any	discrimination	(para.	[52]).	However,	their	counsel	did	refer	to	the	"wrecking	amendment"	introduced	by	Conservative	peers	while	the	Civil	Partnership	Bill	was	going	through	Parliament.	The	unsuccessful	amendment	would	have	permitted	"couples"	within	the	prohibited	degrees	to	enter	civil	partnerships	provided	they	were	over	30	years	of	age	and	had	cohabited	for	12	years	(Hansard	H.L.	Deb.	vol.	422,	cols.	1363-1389	(24	June	2004)).	It	is	unclear	whether	the	applicants	genuinely	wanted	or	expected	the	2004	Act	to	be	applicable	to	situations	such	as	their	own.	On	the	one	hand,	they	emphasised	that	their	circumstances	were	similar	to	those	of	many	civil	partners	in	terms	of	mutual	love	and	commitment.	On	the	other,	they	used	the	Conservative	amendment	merely	to	illustrate	that	a	statutory	scheme	could	be	constructed	to	cover	relationships	such	as	their	own	(a	fact	recognised	by	the	joint	dissenters),	without	suggesting	that	the	2004	Act	must	be	extended	(para.	[52]).	Quite	understandably,	they	simply	sought	a	solution	to	their	predicament,	whatever	form	that	may	take.	However,	these	arguments	concern	a	point	of	great	importance.	While	it	is	true	that	a	sexual	relationship	is	not	required	under	the	Civil	Partnership	Act,	the	same	is	largely	true	for	marriage.	The	absence	of	sex	will	only	invalidate	a	marriage	in	very	restricted	circumstances	that	are	unlikely	to	be	present	in	modern	times	(Matrimonial	Causes	Act	1973,	ss.	12-13),	and	nullity	itself	has	become	somewhat	outmoded.	The	decision	of	the	Court	in	B	and	L	v.	United	Kingdom	(App.	No.	36536/02,	[2006]	1	F.L.R.	35),	in	which	it	held	that	a	former	father	and	daughter-in-law	had	the	right	to	marry	under	the	Convention,	has	re-ignited	the	debate	on	the	appropriateness	of	the	"prohibited	degree"	rules	(see,	e.g.,	J.M.	Scherpe,	"Should	There	be	Degrees	in	Prohibited	Degrees?"	(2006)	62	C.L.J.	32).	However,	their	retention	in	marriage	for	the	time	being	means	that	different	treatment	of	civil	partners	would	suggest	a	divergence	in	the	status	of	marriage	and	civil	
partnership.	This,	in	turn,	would	undermine	the	symbolic	significance	of	the	2004	Act	for	many	same-sex	couples,	thereby	risking	unjustifiable	discrimination	against	them.	Given	these	objections,	the	extension	of	the	2004	Act	to	couples	within	the	prohibited	degrees	would	be	a	wholly	disproportionate	and	simplistic	response	to	what	is	essentially	a	problem	of	taxation.	Moreover,	such	a	move	might	understandably	be	seen	as	a	concession	to	those	opposed	to	the	formalisation	of	same-sex	relationships	in	the	first	place,	rather	than	a	bona	fide	attempt	to	address	the	dilemma	illustrated	in	Burden.	The	conclusion	to	be	drawn	is	that,	although	no	breach	of	the	Convention	occurred	in	the	view	of	the	Court,	Burden	should	prompt	reform.	However,	that	reform	should	be	limited	to	the	tax	system,	and	should	leave	the	concept	of	civil	partnership	intact	to	serve	its	purpose.	While	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	Court	will	continue	to	adopt	such	a	deferential	approach	in	other	areas	of	social	policy,	an	appeal	to	the	Grand	Chamber	in	this	case	seems	likely.		LL.M.;	Robinson	College,	Cambridge.	
